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FAILURE RISK AND QUALITY COST MANAGEMENT IN THE CHOICE OF 
SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE SOURCING 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper examines the supply base composition problem, in particular the choice of single versus 
multiple sourcing, from a quality cost management perspective. There have been over twenty years of 
interest in understanding the relative advantages of single versus multiple sourcing, beginning with 
Deming (1986) and Porter (1985). Many issues have been considered in the literature regarding selecting 
suppliers to form a supply base. For example, Weber, Current, and Benton (1991) have identified more 
than twenty criteria for supplier selection decisions. Among the many factors considered, three of them, 
namely price, delivery, and quality, are often regarded as the core to consider (Lemke et al. 2000). The 
emphasis of this paper is on the last, but not the least, of these major factors: quality. 
A strand of the literature on multiple sourcing has focused on the advantage of price reduction due 
to more suppliers competing with each other (the competition advantage).1 A second, more recent strand 
examines the advantage arising from the protection against supplier failures (the protection advantage).2 
The supplier failures that have been studied are a variety of unreliable supply such as late/insufficient/no 
delivery due to reasons like machine breakdowns, labor strikes, natural disasters, and financial defaults 
(e.g., Federgruen and Yang 2008, 2009, Babich, Burnetas, and Ritchken 2007, Burke, Carrillo, and 
Vakharia 2007, Dada, Petruzzi, and Schwarz 2007). Such failures adversely affect the buying company’s 
production and may result in the loss of sale in the end product market. In contrast, the supplier failure 
studied here is about undependable (or even unsafe) products sold to the customers of the buying 
company, as a result of using product parts with latent defects provided by its suppliers. 
I emphasize the difference between unreliable supply and undependable products. The former is 
caused by random yields, which have been studied extensively (see reviews by Yano and Lee 1995 and 
Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak 2004). The latter is due to latent defects, which is receiving growing attention 
(e.g., Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009). Latent defects are flaws or weaknesses in product items that 
                                                   
1 Studies in this strand often use modeling techniques of the auction literature (e.g., Tunca and Wu 2009). See Mishra and 
Tadikamalla (2006) for a concise review of major results of the models in this strand. Some most recent study, namely Asker and 
Cantillon (2010), considers both the quality level and the price factor. Their model, however, focuses on the procurement of an 
indivisible object. The study is more relevant to settings like defense procurement than the voluminous-quantity setting 
considered here. Inderst (2008) considers the procurement of a volume of goods, however, with homogeneous quality. He focuses 
on non-standard assumptions of having two buyers and auctions organized by suppliers, rather then by a buyer.     
2 Examples in this strand are Berger, Gerstenfeld, and Zeng (2004), Berger and Zeng (2006), and Ruiz-Torres and 
Mahmoodi (2006, 2007). These studies rely mainly on numerical simulation analyses to obtain results, in contrast to the 
analytical modeling method used in this paper. 
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could not be discovered by reasonable inspection prior to the sale. They later manifest as field failures in 
the hands of end customers. Consequences to the buying company (i.e., the manufacturer/retailer to which 
the supplier has sold the faulty items) are all sorts of quality costs. They include costs due to warranty 
repairs, product recalls, defect liability claims, reputation damage, loss of sale, and customer confidence 
restoration efforts (Nagar and Rajan 2001). Such costs originating from latent defects can be huge. For 
instance, in 2001, Ford announced that it would spend $3 billion to replace millions of Firestone tires 
causing customer safety concerns (Bradsher 2001). 
If latent defects are due to occasional independent mistakes, the impact probably is limited. Latent 
defects, however, can result from design flaws, systematic manufacturing faults, or the like (Thirumalai 
and Sinha 2011). In that case, defects can occur in a correlated manner in product items from the same 
supplier.3 As a result, voluminous amounts of product items may be affected. Some of these items with 
latent defects later are identified when field failures occur. Depending on the nature of the product, the 
consequences to end customers can be substantial or even fatal, e.g., the 34 deaths in accidents allegedly 
caused by runaway Toyota vehicles (Shepardson 2010). It is thus crucial to understand how the risk of such 
failures can be diversified and the costs of doing so. I add to the understanding of this issue by analyzing a 
supply base composition model for the LUX (Latent defect-Undependable product-eXternal failure) setting 
described above.  
The question asked in this study is similar to Benjaafar, Elahi, and Donohue’s (2007). They 
examine the outsourcing of a fixed demand for a service at a fixed price to a set of potential suppliers. The 
two competition mechanisms they compare, namely the supplier-selection (SS) versus the supplier-
allocation (SA) approach, are equivalent to single versus multiple sourcing. Their analysis focuses on how 
the relative advantage of SS versus SA is affected by the presence/magnitude of demand-independent 
versus demand-dependent service costs. By contrast, the emphasis here is on the convexity of the external 
failure cost rather than the service/production cost structure. 
The buyer in my model can rank suppliers by a composite score,4 which for simplicity is 
                                                   
3 An example of products with correlated latent defects is hard disk drive. It affects many aspects of modern living, from 
home electronic appliances like digital video recorders to large automation systems controlled by computers that have hard disk 
drives as massive storage devices. According to Paris and Long (2006), “[b]atch-correlated failures result from the manifestation 
of a common defect in most, if not all, disk drives belonging to the same production batch. They are much less frequent than 
random disk failures but can cause catastrophic data losses.” Paris and Long advise that redundant copies of the same data should 
be stored on disks from different batches and, possibly, different manufacturers to reduce impact of batch-correlated failures. 
 
4 Firms like Magna Closures require interested companies to provide detailed information about their business operations in 
order to become certified suppliers of the firms. Only after then would the suppliers receive invitations to submit tenders for the 
firm’s procurement programs. (See, e.g., Magna Closures’ Supplier Quality Manual & Requirements at http://iweb01ds. 
magnaclosures.com .) 
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represented by a supplier’s quality level (i.e., a parameter affecting the defect rate). Multiple sourcing 
cannot be more advantageous than single sourcing unless the expected profit maximizing buyer has a 
desire for risk diversification. In the model, this is due to a quadratic external failure cost representing the 
reputation damage suffered by the buyer, as a result of field failures of undependable products. The cost 
function captures the intuition that as the number of field failures grows, it is increasingly more likely to 
catch the attention of mass media, and the resulting reputation damage is increasingly more detrimental. 
Effectively, the buyer is risk averse, as her payoff is concave due to the convex cost. 
When ignoring any desire for risk diversification, the buyer would source only from the supplier of 
the highest quality because this minimizes the quality cost. However, if risk diversification is desirable, the 
buyer might want to admit another supplier into the supply base and thereby diversify the failure risk 
somewhat. Whether the buyer would continue to admit more depends on how difficult it is to maintain the 
overall quality level of the supply base. With more suppliers selected into the supply base, the buyer had to 
choose from suppliers of further lower qualities. By weighing the incremental quality cost against the 
incremental benefit from further risk diversification, the optimal supply base is determined. 
Under some condition, the optimal supply base has intuitive properties: if a supplier is selected to 
constitute the supply base, any supplier of higher quality must also be selected; moreover, larger 
production quotas should be assigned to higher-quality suppliers. The properties hold under a mild 
condition on the differences among the procurement costs charged by suppliers. This includes equal costs 
as a special case but also allows unequal costs. As long as the condition is fulfilled, the procurement costs 
do not need to have any particular order (e.g., higher-quality suppliers may or may not charge higher 
procurement costs). 
I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for determining the size of the optimal supply base, 
provided the mild condition on the procurement costs holds. If the question is not about determining the 
exact size but merely about whether single or multiple sourcing is optimal, another necessary and sufficient 
condition can be derived without requiring any precondition to hold.  
By analyzing the advantage of multiple sourcing to protect against the failure risk arising in a LUX 
setting, this paper contributes to the literature on multiple sourcing, as well as on supplier selection (e.g., 
Ittner et al. 1999) and on quality management (e.g., Ittner, Nagar, and Rajan 2001). My model highlights 
the sourcing decision as one about selecting the right combination of suppliers to balance between risk 
diversification and quality cost reduction. In contrast, prior studies on multiple sourcing concern mainly 
the number of suppliers that determines the level of competition, with or without externalities among units 
or suppliers (e.g., Baiman and Netessine 2004 and Klotz and Chatterjee 1995; see Elmaghraby 2000 for a 
review of the literature). 
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The paper adds a new perspective to the debate on single versus multiple sourcing. Deming (1986) 
argues that a buying company should take quality costs into consideration and choose single sourcing by 
selecting a high-quality supplier that minimizes total cost of sourcing. The result of this paper suggests that 
in minimizing total cost of sourcing, one might need to use multiple sourcing and include suppliers of 
lower quality. This can happen when the total cost of sourcing counts in the benefit from supplier failure 
risk diversification. Recent studies on the buyer-supplier relationship have highlighted the role of trust in 
the relationship (e.g., Dyer and Chu 2000 and 2011 and Li et al. 2010). However, the breakup of the long-
term buyer-supplier relationship between Ford and Firestone suggests that sometimes it might need more 
than loyalty and trust to deal with the risk of latent defects.  
This study illustrates when multiple sourcing can be used to deal with the risk and when single 
sourcing is preferred despite the risk. It also illustrates how suppliers should be selected into the supply 
base to best deal with the risk. In this regard, the study also contributes to the strategic management 
literature on issues related to alliance partner selection (e.g., Shah and Swaminathan 2008).  
This paper’s closed-form characterization of the optimal supply base with “quality-driven” 
properties substantially reduces the computational complexity of finding the set of selected suppliers. The 
tractability of the model provides promising potential for using it as a building block to integrate with 
another model (e.g., Chao et al. 2009 or Arya and Mittendorf 2007) to study interesting questions. An 
example is the joint use of multiple sourcing and product recall cost sharing to reduce external failure 
risks. Another is the interplay between internal transfers and external procurement in controlling quality 
costs in a LUX setting.  
In the next section, I formulate a quality-cost model of supply base composition. The analysis of 
the baseline model is provided in section 3, where the buyer is supposed to take the per-unit procurement 
costs charged by the suppliers as given. I consider buyer-initiated procurement contracts in section 4, 
where the buyer can use full-commitment contracts to elicit the private information on the suppliers’ unit 
variable production costs. Further discussion on the importance of analyzing the LUX setting is given in 
section 5, where related recent studies are also reviewed. Section 6 contains concluding remarks, with 
technical proofs and derivations and a brief review of economic studies related to multiple sourcing 
relegated to the appendix (appendix A). Recent cases of massive recalls are also included in the appendix 
(appendix B available upon request). Table 1 summarizes the notations used in the paper.  
2. A Quality-cost Model of Supply Base Composition 
Consider a setting with a single buyer and n ≥ 2 available suppliers, indexed by i ∈ N = {1, 2, …, 
n}. The buyer, an expected profit maximizer, designs a finished product, owns the brand, and operates as a 
make-to-order manufacturer. Each unit of the product needs a component part (e.g., the accelerator pedal 
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of a vehicle) to make. Other than this, the rest of the product is manufactured by the buyer. For 
expositional simplicity, I normalize the buyer’s fixed and marginal costs of production to zero. 
Additionally, I assume that except for the component part in concern, the designs of the rest of the product 
are foolproof, and the production quality of the buyer is virtually perfect. In other words, if a product 
failure occurs, it must be due to the failure of the component part. This allows me to focus on the part in 
concern, without being complicated by less essential details like the buyer’s assembly and other parts. The 
analysis can easily be extended to allow for product failures due to independent random failures of the 
other parts used by the buyer. 
Let Q > 0 denote the quantity of the finished products ordered by the end customers of the buyer. 
The manufacturing of the Q units of the required component part is outsourced to the suppliers. Inventory 
holding issues are suppressed to focus on other economic forces driving the sourcing decision.  
The multiple sourcing arrangement analyzed with the model is of the split sense. (See the review 
of related economic studies provided in the appendix for a clarification of the different senses the term 
“multiple sourcing” might mean.) Specifically, the buyer’s problem is to determine a production quota 
allocation Q = (Qi)i∈N to outsource the part production to the suppliers. The determination of the quota Qi ≥ 
0 for supplier i takes into account the suppliers’ quality levels and the prices they charge. Feasibility 
requires ni 1=∑ Qi = Q.  
For analytical convenience, I assume Qi is a real variable, although for ease of interpretation I 
sometimes refer to it as though it were an integer. In practice, the production target Q is likely to be quite 
large and the number of selected suppliers tends to be small. The indivisibility of Qi should be negligible. 
Related economic studies suggest that scale economies in production inherently bias against 
multiple sourcing, whereas scale diseconomies bias towards it. To eliminate such inherent biases, I assume 
the suppliers have constant marginal costs of production and no fixed costs.5 Consequently, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the price quotations provided by the suppliers are piece rates.  
Let ci > 0 denote the procurement cost of the part for each unit ordered from supplier i. My 
analysis starts from the price quotations, ci’s, provided to the buyer and focuses on the quota allocation 
given the price quotations. Nesting the model into an extended setting to analyze the strategic pricing of 
the suppliers is left for future research. In section 4, I explicitly model an asymmetric information setting 
where a buyer-initiated procurement contract can be used to elicit the private information on the suppliers’ 
                                                   
5 In accounting, constant marginal cost is arguably a more widely accepted assumption on cost behavior than increasing or 
decreasing marginal cost. For example, in product costing, the variable cost per unit is typically assumed to be constant within 
the relevant range of production. Zero fixed cost, though uncommon, is a justifiable assumption if accepting the procurement 
order is an incremental production decision falling within the relevant range of production of a supplier.  
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unit variable production costs. With endogenously determined procurement costs in this setting, my results 
continue to hold if the roles of ci’s are substituted by the virtual unit variable production costs (to be 
defined in section 4).  
The design of the component part is believed to be very robust under a wide range of operating 
conditions. Still, it is not infallible. Whether a field failure of the component part will occur depends on 
whether it has a latent defect. By definition, such a defect cannot be discovered by inspection prior to sale. 
For simplicity, I assume that if a latent defect exists in a component part, it will surely reveal itself through 
a field failure. The chance of having a defective part depends on the buyer’s design quality level, as well as 
the production quality of the supplier that manufactures the part. 
Specifically, let Di denote the amount of defective parts in the Qi units of parts produced by 
supplier i. Defects occur in a manner following stochastically proportional yield loss, i.e., Di = RiδiQi. The 
random variables Ri’s are independently and identically distributed with mean E(Ri) = µ, where 0 < µ  ≤ µ¯ 
<< 1, and variance var(Ri) = σ2 > 0. Intuitively, Riδi may be referred to as the random yield loss, although 
for convenience I sometimes use this to refer to Ri alone.  
Besides the variable µ that characterizes the buyer’s design quality level, the random yield loss 
also depends on the parameter δi, where 0 < δi ≤ 1. I refer to 1−δi as the quality-based scoring index of 
supplier i, or simply its quality level. For analytical convenience, assume δi’s are distinct. Without loss of 
generality, I suppose δ1 < δ2 < … <δn so that supplier 1 has the highest quality level, and other suppliers are 
ordered accordingly. Note that although self-reported information collected from the suppliers (see, e.g., 
footnote 4) may be used to determine the parameters δi’s, potentially biased information can be crossed-
checked with independent observations from other sources, e.g., direct visits at suppliers’ production 
facilities. Therefore, the δi’s should be interpreted as the ultimate figures used after adjusting for strategic 
concerns not explicitly modeled here, rather than self-reported figures taken at face value. 
Suppose the latent defect described above is the only sort of defects that could occur in the buyer’s 
or a supplier’s production process. Thus, the total quantity ordered by the buyer is always the same as the 
total quantity delivered by the suppliers. The buyer sells all Q units of finished product to end customers. 
Denote by D = ni 1=∑ Di the total amount of defective products sold. Each customer with a defective 
product will experience a field failure and take the product back for warranty repair. Knowing that the 
product has a defective part, the buyer finds it in its best interest to apply a costly remedy to address the 
problem. For simplicity, I assume the fix is effective: after the warranty repair, the product will not fail 
again.  
Suppose that all warranty related costs are proportional to the amount of products returned for 
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repair, i.e., ωD, where ω > 0. Moreover, the defective products will lead to customer dissatisfaction and 
eventually some additional external failure costs borne by the buyer.6 In particular, I suppose that such 
costs are primarily due to reputation damage. I argue that it is increasingly more likely to catch the 
attention of mass media as D grows, and the resulting reputation damage is increasingly more detrimental. 
This feature is captured by the analytically tractable assumption of a quadratic other external failure cost 
function: CE(D) = cED2, where cE > 0.  
Summing up this and the warranty related costs gives the total external failure cost ωD + cED2. 
Because the increasing marginal cost of CE is with respect to D (i.e., the sum of the Di’s), not its individual 
constituents, the quadratic functional form does not by itself favor multiple sourcing.7  
To see how the allocation of the production quotas to the suppliers may affect the external failure 
costs to the buyer, one can examine the expected value of ωD + cED2 below (see the appendix for the 
derivation): 
E[ωD + cED2] = ωµ[ ni 1=∑ δiQi] + cEµ2[ ni 1=∑ δiQi]2 + cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2]. 
Interestingly, although the expected external failure cost is a second-order polynomial of Qi’s, sharing the 
production target Q among the suppliers cannot reduce the cost unless σ2 > 0. If instead the “random yield 
losses” Ri’s were deterministic, the third term in E[ωD + cED2] would vanish. In that case, assigning all the 
Q to the supplier with the lowest δi would minimize the expected external failure costs.  
Summarized below is the event sequence of the model: 
1.  The suppliers provide price quotations on the per-unit procurement costs ci’s they will charge to 
the buyer.   
2.  The buyer outsources the production of the component part to the suppliers, with a production 
quota Qi allocated to supplier i. 
3.  Suppliers manufacture the parts according to the allocated quotas. The ordered amounts, Qi’s, are 
delivered to the buyer. Out of the amount Qi, Di = RiδiQi are defective parts. (The values of Di’s are 
unobservable to the buyer until later.) 
                                                   
6 Though not critical in this study (but can be important to nesting the model into an extended setting to examine related 
issues), the suppliers are assumed to have no external failure cost. This is in line with the belief that “[a]utomakers generally 
don’t like to focus on their suppliers, or even identify them” (Healey 2010). When identifying the involved suppliers is 
unavoidable, e.g., due to the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requirements, it is believed that the 
suppliers “almost always avoid attention, even when their name is in the public record” (Szczesny 2010). A legal professional 
also commented that “[s]uppliers usually aren’t part of legal actions unless the automaker can’t be sued. … It’s harder to prove 
fault at suppliers, which often build parts to specifications and aren’t involved in testing them[.]” (Green and Ramsey 2010). 
7 To see this, imagine the hypothetical case where the proportions of Di’s in D could be directly controlled by the buyer. 
Then it is clear that as long as the total, D, remained constant, there could not be any gain or loss from shifting among the Di’s. 
Even though Di’s actually are random variables, multiple sourcing cannot create any benefit unless the randomness of Di’s 
resulting from the supplier failure risk is diversifiable. This last point will become clear shortly below. 
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4.  The buyer uses the parts to manufacture the finished products and sells them to end customers.  
5.  Customers who purchased the D = ni 1=∑ Di units of defective products eventually experience field 
failures and return the products for warranty repair. The values of Di’s become known to the buyer. 
The buyer incurs warranty related expenses of ωD and suffers reputation damage equivalent to a 
dollar cost of CE(D) = cED2. 
3. Optimal Quota Allocation: Single versus Multiple Sourcing 
The buyer’s problem is to choose a production quota allocation Q = (Qi)i∈N to minimize its 
expected total cost of sourcing. The allocation must specify quotas that sum to the required procurement 
quantity Q. The optimization program below formally summarizes the buyer’s sourcing problem: 
[SB]  Min
 iQ
 ni 1=∑ ciQi + ωµ[ ni 1=∑ δiQi] + cEµ2[ ni 1=∑ δiQi]2 + cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2] 
subject to 
QC:    ni 1=∑ Qi = Q  
with non-negative Qi’s. The choice of the production quotas Qi’s indirectly determines the supply base B = 
{ i∈N | Qi > 0 }, i.e., the set of suppliers selected by the buyer. Let b denote the size of the supply base, i.e., 
the number of selected suppliers. The type of a supply base, B, is said to be single sourcing if b = 1 and 
multiple sourcing if b ≥ 2. In particular, if b = 2, B is also said to be of the dual sourcing type. 
To simplify the expression of the buyer’s expected total cost of sourcing, I define the following 
notations: 
η ≡ (µ/σ)2 
si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ2 
The parameter η is the squared standardized mean of the “random yield loss” Ri, which means η−1 is the 
squared coefficient of variation. The parameter si is a ratio representing the relative unimportance of the 
quadratic other external failure cost, characterized by cE, in constituting the buyer’s expected total cost. 
With these notations, the expected total cost of sourcing can be expressed as  
C(Q; s) ≡ cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ siQi + η( ni 1=∑ δiQi)2 + ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2], 
where s = (si)i∈N. Clearly, C(Q; s) is strictly convex in Q and linear in s. Another, even more intuitive, way 
to express C(Q; s) is  
n
i 1=∑ ciQi + CX(Q), 
where the first term is the outlay procurement cost and the second term CX(Q) ≡ C(Q;(ωµ/cEσ2)δ), with δ = 
(δi)i∈N, is the expected external failure cost. The functions C(Q; s) and CX(Q) will appear again in section 4 
where I model the suppliers’ private information on their production costs explicitly.  
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Whether multiple sourcing has advantages over single sourcing, or the other way around, depends 
on the optimal choice of Qi’s and the resulting size of B. The following result tells us when the protection 
advantage of multiple sourcing may fail to exist.  
PROPOSITION 1 (CONDITIONS FOR NON-EXISTENCE OF PROTECTION ADVANTAGE OF MULTIPLE 
SOURCING):  Suppose the ascending ranking of the suppliers based on si also has supplier 1 ranked 
highest. Or, alternatively, suppose that for any distinct j and k with (δk – δj)(sk – sj) ≤ 0,  
(sj – sk)/(δk – δj) < 2ηδ1Q. 
Then multiple sourcing has no advantage over single sourcing if one of the following holds: 
(a) The variance of the “random yield loss” is negligible, i.e., σ2 → 0; 
(b) The marginal other external failure cost is negligible, i.e., cE → 0. 
The result of this proposition needs one of two preconditions: either that both the si-based and δi-based 
rankings have supplier 1 ranked highest, or that whenever they differ in ranking suppliers j and k, the 
cardinal difference sj – sk, relative to δk – δj, is not too large. When one of these preconditions holds, the 
reason for multiple sourcing to be advantageous comes solely from the protection against supplier failure 
risk due to latent defects. Multiple sourcing becomes unattractive if there is little risk to protect against, or 
the benefit (i.e., external failure cost saved) from the protection is tiny.  
Two model elements contributing to the protection advantage of multiple sourcing are highlighted 
by the proposition. The first is about the nature of the supplier failure risk. If the “risk” is not due to 
variation in the yield but merely about not knowing which unit is defective (e.g., the fully predictable 
yields assumed in Burke et al. 2007), there might not be room for risk diversification by multiple sourcing.  
The second element is related to the nature of the external failure costs considered here. With 
genuine random yields, the quadratic other external failure cost induces a desire for spreading the supplier 
failure risk by multiple sourcing. If the marginal other external failure cost is negligible, the buyer will 
remain “risk-neutral” to the risk. The protection advantage of multiple sourcing therefore cannot exist.  
Below I will characterize the unique optimal production quota allocation for the buyer’s sourcing 
problem, identify some intuitive features of the allocation, and derive necessary and sufficient conditions 
for determining the exact size of the optimal supply base and whether single or multiple sourcing is 
optimal. These results are stated in terms of the quality-adjusted cost-based scoring index defined as 
follows: 
.
)2(
)( 2
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E* 
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It will be clear shortly that the µW* in the index is simply the expected number of external failures given 
the optimally allocated production quotas.  
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If suppliers’ qualities are nearly identical (i.e., δi’s are almost the same), the ranking by Si(W*) is 
not much different from that by ci. Alternatively, if production costs are equal, Si(W*) and δ i give the same 
ranking. Even when the costs are unequal, the ranking by Si(W*) and by δ i can still be the same, provided 
ci’s are “not too unequal.” Specifically, this means  
.)2(max 1E
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In words, the condition requires that the cost saving from using a lower-quality supplier is not too attractive 
given the loss in quality. 
The first major result below characterizes the optimal quota allocation without imposing the 
condition of “not too unequal” costs. Subsequently, it is added to put more structure on the optimal quota 
allocation.   
PROPOSITION 2 (OPTIMAL QUOTA ALLOCATION):  A quantity vector Q* = (Qi*)i∈N is the unique 
optimal quota allocation for the buyer’s sourcing problem if and only if for some θ* > 0, the following 
marginal conditions are satisfied:  
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    for all i ∈ N 
with the equality holding for all i’s in the supply base B* ≡ { i∈N | Qi* > 0 }, where 
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is a quality-adjusted cost-based scoring index and θ* and W* are given by the following formulas:   
(η−1+b*)[2Q+ *B∑ (sl/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl)][ *B∑ (sl/δl)]θ* =
(η−1+b*)[ *B∑ (1/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl)]2 
(1)
 
[ *B∑ (1/δl)][2Q+ *B∑ (sl/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl2)][ *B∑ (sl/δl)] W* =
2η[ (η−1+b*)[ *B∑ (1/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl)]2 ] 
, (2)
 
with b* ≡ |B*| denoting the size of the supply base, η ≡ (µ/σ)2 denoting the squared standardized mean of 
the “random yield loss” Ri, and si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ2. Moreover, W* = *B∑ δlQl* = ni 1=∑ δiQi*.  
This proposition provides a closed-form characterization of the unique optimal quota allocation 
Q*. Once the supply base B* is determined, the optimal quota for a selected supplier i can be computed 
with the simple formula 
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whose key constituents, θ* and W*, are given by another two formulas specified in the proposition. 
Although the procedure is straightforward, determining the optimal combination of suppliers to constitute 
the supply base can be prohibitively complex. This is especially so when the number of available suppliers 
is large. In a different but related setting, Federgruen and Wang (2008) show that a similar combinatorial 
optimization problem of supplier selection is NP-complete. 
However, suppose that the ranking of the suppliers by the quality-adjusted cost-based scoring 
index Si(W*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW*)µδi]/cEσ2 is the same as that by δi. This would be the case if the differences 
among the costs ci’s are sufficiently small and the marginal other external failure cost cE, or the production 
target Q and hence W* = ni 1=∑ δiQi*, is sufficiently large. Under such circumstances, the weight attached to 
the second component of Si(W*) will be large enough to let δi dominate this scoring index. Consequently, 
the unique optimal quota allocation Q* will have some simple, intuitive properties.  
The first property is a positive association between the quality of a selected supplier and the quota 
assigned to it. That is to say, the higher the quality of a supplier (i.e., with a lower δi), the (weakly) larger 
the quota assigned to it. As a result, if a supplier is selected into the supply base, any suppliers of higher 
quality will also be selected. These intuitive properties are defined below formally. 
DEFINITION 1:  The supply base B* of the optimal quota allocation Q* is (weakly) quality-driven 
if the selection of a supplier into the supply base implies also the selection of any higher-quality suppliers, 
i.e., j ∈ B* ⇒ j–1 ∈ B* for all j ∈ B*\{1}, or equivalently B* = {1, 2, …, b*}. 
DEFINITION 2:  The supply base B* of the optimal quota allocation Q* is strongly quality-driven if 
the quota allocated to a supplier is at least as high as those allocated to any lower-quality suppliers, i.e.,  Qj* 
≤ Qj−1* for all j ∈ B*\{1}. 
Obviously, a strongly quality-driven B* is also (weakly) quality-driven but not necessarily the other 
way around. 
PROPOSITION 3 (QUALITY-DRIVEN SUPPLY BASE):  Suppose max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ 
(ω + 2cEµδ1Q)µ. Then the supply base B* of the optimal quota allocation Q* is strongly quality-driven, i.e., 
Qj* ≤ Qj−1* for all j ∈ B*\{1}. Consequently, it is also (weakly) quality-driven, i.e., B* = {1, 2, …, b*}.  
Despite no fixed costs for selecting more suppliers, expanding the supply base can be costly 
because it means using suppliers of lower quality than the incumbent ones. The increase in this cost as 
lower-quality suppliers are included into the supply base eventually may limit its size. An interesting 
question to ask is when it will stop at the size of one (i.e., single sourcing is optimal) and when it will stop 
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at a size larger than one (i.e., multiple sourcing is optimal). The following results shed some light on this 
question. 
PROPOSITION 4 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR DETERMINING THE SIZE OF THE 
OPTIMAL SUPPLY BASE):  Suppose max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ (ω + 2cEµδ1Q)µ. Then the size of 
the (smallest) optimal supply base is j (i.e., b* = j), where j ∈ N\{n}, if and only if there exist positive θj 
and Wj defined by formulas (1) and (2) with B* substituted by Bj ≡ {1, …, j} such that     
[θj − Sj(Wj)]/2δj2 > 0 ≥ [θj − Sj+1(Wj)]/2δj+12, 
where Si(W) ≡ [ci + (ω+2cEµW)µδi]/cEσ2. If the condition above is not satisfied by any j < n, b* = n. 
This proposition provides a characterization of b*, the size of the optimal supply base. Determining 
b* can be rather complex owing to the combinatorial nature of the supplier selection problem. However, if 
the precondition of the proposition holds, i.e., the differences between consecutive ci’s are “not too large,” 
then the problem of determining the size of the optimal supply base can be reduced to simply comparing 
the n quality-driven supply bases, i.e., Bj ≡ {1, …, j} for j ∈ N. This comparison only requires solving for 
each j a linear equation system with two unknowns, i.e., θj and Wj, and then search for the j with the lowest 
positive value of [θj − Sj(Wj)]/2δj2. Such a problem takes much less time to solve than the original problem. 
 Suppose one only needs to determine whether single sourcing or multiple sourcing is optimal, 
without actually identifying the size of the optimal supply base for the latter case. Then the problem can be 
simplified even without a precondition. Why? Proposition 2 already provides the necessary and sufficient 
condition for checking whether any given supply base B is optimal. For the case of single sourcing, there 
are only n such candidate supply bases to check. If none of them is optimal, the optimal arrangement must 
be multiple sourcing. To check whether a singleton supply base is optimal, it does not require the 
remaining unselected suppliers to be lined up in certain orders. One only needs to ensure that the buyer 
cannot be better off by shifting some quota away from a candidate single-sourcing supplier. This result is 
the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR SINGLE SOURCING TO BE 
OPTIMAL):  Let θ h ≡ sh + 2(1+η)Qδh2 and W h ≡ δhQ for all h ∈ N. Then single sourcing is optimal if and 
only if there exists h ∈ N such that     
max i∈N\{h} [(θ h − Si(W h))/2δi2] ≤ 0, 
where Si(W) ≡ [ci + (ω+2cEµW)µδi]/cEσ2 = si + 2ηWδi and si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ2. The h satisfying the condition 
above is the only selected supplier of the single-sourcing supply base.  
In the necessary and sufficient condition of this proposition, there is no counterpart of the [θj − 
Sj(Wj)]/2δj2 > 0 required in Proposition 4. The reason is that such a requirement is automatically satisfied 
for the case of single sourcing. Using the definitions of θ h and W h, it is easy to verify that [θ h − 
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Sh(W h)]/2δh2 = Q > 0, regardless of the h ∈ N in concern. The requirement of 0 ≥ [θj − Sj+1(Wj)]/2δj+12 in 
Proposition 4 as well as its precondition max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ2 are  
substituted by the condition that max i∈N\{h} [(θ h − Si(W h))/2δi2] ≤ 0 for some h. While this looks more 
complicated, it does not impose any ordering on the ci’s or restrictions on their differences. In terms of 
computational complexity, checking the condition requires calculating n−1 values of [(θ h − Si(W h))/2δi2] 
for each h ∈ N. This amounts to a total of n(n−1) calculations, a more complicated task but still 
manageable within a reasonable time.  
I end this section with the following comparative statics result on the optimal quota allocation 
characterized in Proposition 2. This is a general result without requiring “not too unequal” costs. It 
confirms the intuition of reducing the quota allocated to a supplier if it charges a higher cost. Beyond this, 
the result also paves the road for proving a main result in the next section for the asymmetric information 
setting with buyer-initiated procurement contracts.  
PROPOSITION 6 (NON-INCREASING RESPONSE OF A SUPPLIER’S QUOTA TO THE COST IT 
CHARGES):  For any given c−i = (cj*)j∈N\i charged by other suppliers, the optimal production quota Qi* 
allocated to supplier i is non-increasing in the cost ci charged by the supplier.   
In proving this proposition, it would be nice if some function involved is differentiable. However, 
this is not obvious. To get around the problem, I apply the technique of supermodularity. This makes the 
proof simple even without differentiability.   
4. Buyer-initiated Procurement Contracts with Privately Known Production Costs 
So far the buyer is supposed to take the per-unit procurement costs charged by the suppliers as 
given and allocate production quotas accordingly. In this section, I continue to assume the quality 
parameters are known to the buyer through a prior supplier certification process (not modeled here). 
However, owing to the changing environments specific to the individual suppliers, they have private 
information on their unit variable costs of production. I consider a setting whether the buyer can use full-
commitment, take-it-or-leave-it contracts to elicit the private information from the suppliers. The basic 
setup remains the same as that in the previous section, except that the roles of the procurement costs 
previously taken as given are now substituted by the contractual payments specified in the optimal 
procurement contracts. 
Let vi denote the unit variable cost of production privately known to supplier i. This is the type of 
the supplier. For analytical simplicity, independent types are assumed, which means vi’s are independently 
drawn from the probability distribution functions Fi(vi)’s. For expositional simplicity, I assume Fi(vi) = 
F(vi) with the probability density function f(vi) > 0 for all vi ∈ [v, v¯], where 0 < v < v¯ < ∞, and f(vi) = 0 
otherwise. I also assume that f(vi) is continuous on [v, v¯]. Despite the symmetric assumption on F(vi)’s, the 
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model is still asymmetric because of the unequal quality parameters assumed. The analysis below can 
easily be extended to the more general setting with asymmetric Fi(vi)’s.    
Invoking the revelation principle (Myerson 1981), the buyer only needs to focus on direct-
revelation contracts in searching for an optimal procurement arrangement on the quota allocation and 
payments. With only adverse selection and risk neutral parties, there is no gain to make the contracts 
contingent on the numbers of defective items Di’s. Moreover, because of the strictly convex expected 
external failure cost CX(Q) and the risk neutrality in payments, the buyer can confine to deterministic 
contracts without loss of generality. 
Let m = (mi)i∈N ∈ [v, v¯]n be the profile of reports submitted by the suppliers. For any report m, let 
Qi(m) and Pi(m) denote the allocation and payment to supplier i, respectively, if m is received. I assume 
that the allocation and payment rules Qi(?) and Pi(?) are continuous and non-negative functions. A feasible 
procurement contract is a profile of allocation and payment rules 〈Q(?), P(?)〉, where Q(?) = (Qi(?))i∈N and 
P(?) = (Pi(?))i∈N, such that they satisfy the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, in 
addition to the quota constraint: 
IC(vi, mi):  Eπi(vi)  ≥  Eπi(mi, vi)  for all i ∈ N, vi ∈ [v, v¯], and mi ∈ [v, v¯] 
IR(vi):   Eπi(vi)  ≥  0   for all i ∈ N and vi ∈ [v, v¯]  
QC(v):   ni 1=∑ Qi(v)  =  Q   for all v = (vi)i∈N ∈ [v, v¯]n,  
where Eπi(vi) = Eπi(vi, vi), Eπi(mi, vi) = E−i[πi(mi, vi)], with the expectation E−i[?] taken over v−i = (vj)j∈N\i, 
and πi(mi, vi) = Pi(mi, v−i) − viQi(mi, v−i).  
 The following result completely characterizes the set of feasible procurement contracts. 
LEMMA 1 (FEASIBLE PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS):  A procurement contract 〈Q(?), P(?)〉 is 
feasible if and only if the following conditions hold:  For any i ∈ N, vi ∈ [v, v¯], and mi ∈ [v, v¯],  
(i) mi ≥ vi  ⇒  E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)] ≥ E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)], i.e., exaggerating vi results in less quota allocation 
on average;  
(ii) Eπi(vi) = Eπi(v¯) + ∫ vvi E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]dti, i.e., a lower type’s expected payoff is the highest type’s plus 
an information rent;  
(iii) Eπi(v¯) ≥ 0, i.e., it suffices to ensure only the highest type’s individual rationality constraint;  
(iv) ni 1=∑ Qi(v) = Q, which is the quota constraint. 
 It turns out that what determines the minimized total expected cost of sourcing is only the quota 
allocation rules. Given the optimal allocation rules determined, payment rules can always be constructed to 
fulfill all the feasibility conditions in Lemma 1 that ensure incentive compatibility and individual 
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rationality. It will also be clear that the buyer’s expected total cost of sourcing under this asymmetric 
information setting is basically the same as that in the previous section with the per-unit procurement costs 
ci’s taken as given. The key difference is the replacement of ci by the virtual unit variable cost of 
production defined as follows:   
p(vi) ≡ vi + F(vi)/f(vi). 
Below is the lemma summarizing these findings.    
LEMMA 2 (SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS):  Let γ(v) = 
((p(vi)+ωµδi)/cEσ2)i∈N with p(vi) = vi + F(vi)/f(vi). Suppose that given γ(v), the allocation rule profile Q*(?) 
minimizes the expected total cost of sourcing E[C(Q(v); γ(v))] subject to the quota constraint ni 1=∑ Qi(v) = 
Q for all v∈ [v, v¯]n. Then 〈Q*(?), P*(?)〉 is an optimal procurement contract if for all i ∈ N,  
(a) the allocation rule Qi*(vi, v−i) is non-increasing in vi given v−i, and  
(b) the payment rule is Pi*(v) = viQi*(v) + ∫ vvi Qi*(ti, v−i)dti. 
The last main result below shows that all the findings in the previous section continue to hold 
under asymmetric information on the unit variable production costs vi’s, provided that the role of the per-
unit procurement cost previously taken as given is substituted by the virtual unit variable production cost 
p(vi) with p(vi) being non-decreasing in vi. This last condition is satisfied if the hazard rate F(vi)/f(vi) is a 
non-decreasing function. 
 PROPOSITION 7 (OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACT):  Suppose for any realization v∈ [v, v¯]n, 
Q*(v) is a quota allocation satisfying the conditions in Proposition 2 with ci = p(vi) ≡ vi + F(vi)/f(vi). If p(vi) 
is non-decreasing in vi, then 〈Q*(?), P*(?)〉, with Pi*(v) = viQi*(v) + ∫ vvi Qi*(ti, v−i)dti, is an optimal 
procurement contract. Furthermore, if the variation in v is sufficiently small, e.g., p(v¯) − p(v) ≤ (ω + 
2cEµδ1Q)µ[min i∈{2,…,n} (δi − δi−1)], then the optimal quota allocation Q*(v) is strongly quality-driven for 
any realized v.   
5. Discussions: Importance of Quality Costs and Related Recent Studies  
Quality, in particular product safety, is an important factor to consider in supplier selection 
decisions. Supporting this view, 78% of the senior executives participating in a survey answered that 
product safety is among the greatest risks in relation to the integrity of their supply chains. In addition, 
68% of them cited quality as the main risk of global sourcing (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). 
Recently, product safety concerns related to global sourcing have hit the headlines repeatedly. The 
most noticeable cases are recalls of unsafe products manufactured by suppliers in China (more details 
given in the appendix). For instance, Mattel recalled 436,000 Chinese-made toy cars covered with lead 
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paint in 2007 (Story and Barboza 2007). Other recent recalls for unsafe products include a drug, namely 
heparin, and dairy products. In both cases, the products were tainted by contaminants structurally so 
similar to the real ingredients that they could not have been distinguished by routine tests. Such latent 
defects, like the use of lead paint, are flaws affecting voluminous amounts of products and yet 
unforeseeable or undiscoverable at the time of buying from the suppliers. By the time the flaws are noticed, 
the defective products have reached the hands of end customers, or may even have caused irreversible 
damages. Quality costs to the buying companies of such defective products are no doubt an essential factor 
to consider in forming the supply base. 
Although recent cases of massive recalls often involve suppliers from low-cost countries like 
China, product quality problems are a universal business issue rather than exclusive to sourcing from 
developing countries. For example, alongside with the recall for lead-paint toys in 2007, Mattel also 
recalled 18.2 million magnetized toys made in China following Mattel’s design specification (Story and 
Barboza 2007). In other words, any high-quality suppliers, western or Asian, would have made these 
unsafe toys designed by Mattel, the world’s largest toy company.  
Other well-known companies from developed countries have also recalled defective products for 
safety reasons. For instance, in 2000 Bridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires that seemed to have 
an unusually high risk of tread failures (Bridgestone/Firestone 2000). Tires with this defect were linked to 
crashes killing 271 people and causing over 800 injuries (NHTSA 2001). Many of the tires were installed 
on Ford Motor’s vehicles because Firestone is a long-term major supplier of Ford. To restore customer 
confidence, Ford later announced the replacement of about 13 million Firestone tires installed on Ford 
vehicles by non-Firestone brands (Bradsher 2001). This move ended the nearly century-long buyer-
supplier relationship between Ford and Firestone (Hakim 2004).8 
Regardless of low-cost suppliers from China or well-known suppliers from the western world, 
latent defects may exist in their products. The quality costs to the buying companies are enormous. Mattel 
estimated that the cost of recalling 1.5 million toys coated with toxic levels of lead paint could amount $30 
million (Barboza 2007). Ford expected to spend $3 billion in a nine-month program to replace millions of 
Firestone tires causing customer safety concerns (Bradsher 2001, Hakim 2004). Besides the loss of sale 
and other quality costs that can be estimated, damage claims in defect liability lawsuits are difficult to 
                                                   
8 Besides Bridgestone, other first-tier suppliers in the automotive sector also are involved in recalls of unsafe products. For 
example, “Chrysler said the cause of [a steering-related] defect was a change by its axle supplier Dana Corp. [in the 
manufacturing process]” (Shepardson 2011). Another example is that “a defective [module] was found at a Chrysler instrument 
panel supplier[, TRW Automotive Electronics Group,] and “[i]n the event of a crash, the driver’s airbag will not deploy” 
(Rudnitsky Law Firm 2009). A third example is Federal-Mogul’s recall of replacement control arm assemblies for Chrysler 
vehicles (Seetharaman 2010). Dana, TRW, and Federal-Mogul are Tier 1 suppliers in the automotive sector, according to Ernst & 
Young (2008, p. 3). 
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assess.  
Despite the importance of the product safety issue arising from latent defects, models analyzing the 
protection advantage of multiple sourcing have concentrated on supplier failures due to unreliably supply. 
In this paper, I use a latent-defect model with non-linear external failure costs to capture the sort of supplier 
failure risk relevant to the product safety issues discussed above. To highlight the benefit from risk 
diversification as a reason for multiple sourcing, the model assumes away other reasons such as capacity 
constraints. Moreover, certainty in lead time and delivery is assumed to avoid overlapping with prior 
studies’ emphases.9 To focus on the choice of single versus multiple sourcing, the model also abstracts 
away from other aspects of supply chain management already extensively studied in the literature, such as 
coordination for information sharing. (See Kouvelis, Chambers, and Wang 2006 for a review of the supply 
chain management literature and Cachon 2003 for a review specifically on supply chain coordination with 
incentive contracts.)  
I take the perspective of viewing the choice of single versus multiple sourcing as a supply base 
composition problem. The question asked is about what combination of suppliers can diversify the risk of 
latent defects most efficiently, in terms of the incremental quality cost to pay as a sacrifice. Instead of 
formulating a very general model that requires combinatorial mathematical techniques to solve, I structure 
the model in a tractable stylized fashion, yet rich enough to capture the fundamental economic tradeoff.10  
Recently, Federgruen and Yang (2008) has examined a general setting of the supplier selection 
problem that also emphasizes the optimal combination of suppliers. They show that this is an NP-complete 
combinatorial optimization problem. Their focus is to develop an accurate approximation method to 
overcome the computational complexity of the problem. Dada et al. (2007) and Federgruen and Yang 
(2009) have also considered similar general settings, with a focus on characterizing and solving the 
supplier selection problem with random yields and uncertain demand.  
In contrast, I consider a simple setting with no random yields nor uncertain demand but only latent 
defects. Complementing prior studies, this paper emphasizes the linkage between supplier selection and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
9 Reasons for favoring single or multiple sourcing that have been studied include supplier capacity constraints, saving in 
outgoing order/incoming inspection/transportation costs, saving in inventory holding costs by shortening the delivery lead time, 
quantity discounts due to production scale economies, saving in purchasing costs by supplier competition (with or without 
information asymmetry), and encouraging investment by suppliers to reduce production costs or to improve product quality. 
These reasons have been examined extensively in economic and operations research/management science (OR/MS) studies. 
Concise reviews of related OR/MS studies can be found in Berger and Zeng (2006) and Mishra and Tadikamalla (2006). A 
review of related studies in economics is provided in the appendix.  
10 Other studies in the quality management literature have focused on incentive contracting related to a variety of quality 
improvement arrangements like vender certification, incoming inspection, and product recall/warranty cost sharing (e.g., 
Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005, Hwang et al. 2006, Chao et al. 2009, Baiman et al. 2000, 2001). These models have only 
one supplier without considering multiple sourcing and supplier failure risk diversification. 
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external failure costs. My model allows a closed-form characterization of the optimal quota allocation 
through which the fundamental economic driving forces can be clearly seen. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Challenged by the success of Japanese manufacturers, western firms have adopted Japanese 
management methods, most notably just-in-time (JIT) operations and total quality management (TQM).11 
These methods are inter-related. For example, excellent supplier relations are important to both JIT 
operations and TQM.12 Successful implementation of these methods is impossible unless suppliers can 
commit to timely deliveries of defect-free items. Given the substantial rework required, timely deliveries of 
defective items are not obviously better than late deliveries of defect-free items. Thus, quality is an 
important factor in supplier selection even when delivery is taken into consideration. 
In selecting suppliers, a key issue is the choice of single versus multiple sourcing. Relying on only 
a single supplier, or just a few, in sourcing an item is a distinct characteristic of buyer-supplier relationships 
in Japan. This is also believed to be crucial to JIT implementation and the success of Japanese companies 
(see discussions in Asanuma 1989, Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, and Nishiguchi and Anderson 1995 for 
further details). Richardson (1993) notes that although U.S. quality experts (e.g., Deming 1986) 
recommend single sourcing, the traditional practice in the western world and the strategic management 
literature then (e.g., Porter 1985) generally favor multiple sourcing. Likewise, Morris and Imire (1992) 
point out that multiple sourcing has traditionally been used by British manufacturers as “a means of 
ensuring competitive tendering, by playing the suppliers off against each other.”  
The successful experience of Japanese industries has led western firms to reconsider their 
purchasing strategies (Deming 1986, Ansari and Modarress 1990). Although there have been studies 
rigorously examining the competition advantage of multiple sourcing, its advantage to protect against 
supplier failures has received little attention until recent years. While there are more studies examining the 
protection against supply disruption risks, research focusing on the LUX setting discussed in this paper 
remains sparse. Difficult situations like the one Toyota recently faced suggest more research in this strand 
would better inform managers of important considerations in the sourcing and supplier selection decisions. 
My study contributes to the growing literature addressing this need.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
11 Elements of TQM were introduced to Japan by American advisors such as Drs. Deming and Juran after WWII. The ideas 
were then refined and further developed in Japan before they drew the attention of western industries in 1970’s as a consequence 
of the challenge by successful Japanese companies such as Sony and Toyota. An overview of this history can be found in 
Steeples (1992) and Cali (1993). Cases on the attempts of North American manufacturers to implement JIT production and total 
quality control (TQC) can be found in Schonberger (1987).   
12 See Flynn, Sakakibara, and Schroeder (1995) for discussions on the relationship between JIT and TQM and Hutchins 
(1992) for discussions on the importance of supplier relations to these management methods.  
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Quality cost concepts have been introduced into managerial accounting textbooks for some years 
(e.g., Horngren, Foster, and Datar 1994, Garrison, Noreen, and Brewer 2008). Although attempts have 
been made to investigate TQM and JIT operations (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994, Alles, Datar, and Lambert 
1995, Ittner and Larcker 1995, Cremer 1995, and Barron and Gjerde 1996), there remain a lot to explore in 
relation to quality costs. This paper represents another step towards this direction with regard to quality 
cost management in the supply base composition decision. 
There are several interesting directions for extending the analysis of this paper. A possible 
extension is to incorporate the buyer’s quality improvement effort to raise the design quality level µ and the 
suppliers’ efforts to reduce the defect rate parameter δi’s. Another is to nest the model into an extended 
setting to analyze the strategic pricing and competition among the suppliers. A third direction is to identify 
circumstances where even without the condition of “not too unequal” costs, the optimal supply base is still 
quality-driven. Given the limited space here, these interesting extensions are left for future research. 
Appendix A 
DERIVATION OF THE EXPECTED TOTAL EXTERNAL FAILURE COST: To derive E[ωD + cED2], 
first note that E(D2) = var(D) + E(D)2. Hence,  
E[ωD + cED2]  
= ωE[D] + cEE[D2] 
= ωE[D] + cEE[D]2 + cEvar[D] 
= ωE[ ni 1=∑ Di] + cE(E[ ni 1=∑ Di])2 + cEvar[ ni 1=∑ Di]  
= ω ni 1=∑ E[Di] + cE( ni 1=∑ E[Di])2 + cE ni 1=∑ var[Di]  
= ω ni 1=∑ µδiQi + cE[ ni 1=∑ µδiQi]2 + cE ni 1=∑ σ2(δiQi)2 
= ωµ[ ni 1=∑ δiQi] + cEµ2[ ni 1=∑ δiQi]2 + cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2].     Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (CONDITIONS FOR NON-EXISTENCE OF PROTECTION ADVANTAGE OF 
MULTIPLE SOURCING): When one of the two conditions holds, i.e., either σ2 → 0 or cE → 0, the buyer’s 
expected total cost becomes cEµ2[ ni 1=∑ ∆iQi + ( ni 1=∑ δiQi)2] or simply ni 1=∑ (ci+ωµδi)Qi, where ∆i ≡ 
(ci+ωµδi)/cEµ2. Suppose the ascending ranking of the suppliers based on ∆i’s also has supplier 1 ranked 
highest. Then obviously setting Q1 = Q minimizes ni 1=∑ δiQi as well as ni 1=∑ ∆iQi individually. 
Consequently, the expected total cost must also be minimized when Q1 = Q. Thus, multiple sourcing 
cannot be better than single sourcing. 
Alternatively, suppose that for any distinct j and k with (δk – δj)(sk – sj) ≤ 0, (sj – sk)/(δk – δj) < 
2ηδ1Q. Then if multiple sourcing is better than single sourcing, the supply base must not contain any j and 
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n with the property above. Otherwise, assuming without loss of generality that δj < δk, I can rearrange the 
allocation by shifting some amount of Qk to Qj and thereby reducing the sum ni 1=∑ ∆iQi + ( ni 1=∑ δiQi)2 in 
the expected total cost.  
To see this, simply differentiate the sum with respect to Qi to get the derivative ∆i + 2δi( ni 1=∑ δiQi). 
Note that si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ2 = η∆i. So for δj < δk, (sj–sk)/(δk–δj) < 2ηδ1Q implies (∆j–∆k) < 2(δk–δj)δ1Q < 
2(δk–δj)( ni 1=∑ δiQi). Hence,  
∆j + 2δj( ni 1=∑ δiQi) < ∆k + 2δk( ni 1=∑ δiQi), 
implying that shifting some amount of Qk to Qj will reduce the expected total cost further. This leads to the 
conclusion that any multiple-sourcing supply base must include only suppliers with δi’s and si’s showing 
exactly the same ranking. 
 However, with such a ranking of the selected suppliers, the expected total cost can be minimized 
with Q assigned solely to the supplier ranked highest in the supply base, i.e., the one with the lowest 
baseline defect rate among the suppliers selected. This contradicts the initial supposition that multiple 
sourcing can be better than single sourcing if (sj – sk)/(δk – δj) < 2δ1Q for any distinct j and k with (δk – 
δj)(sk – sj) ≤ 0.   Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 (OPTIMAL QUOTA ALLOCATION): The existence of an optimal quota 
allocation is guaranteed because any feasible allocation must be from the closed and bounded domain 
[0,Q]n and the objective function and constraints of the optimization problem are concave and linear, 
respectively. The following is the Lagrangian of program SB (with constraint QC decomposed into two 
inequality constraints):      
L = −cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ siQi + η( ni 1=∑ δiQi)2 + ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2] + θ¯( ni 1=∑ Qi − Q) + _θ(Q − ni 1=∑ Qi) 
with η ≡ (µ/σ)2 and si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ2. Since L is strictly concave in Q = (Qi)i∈N, a Q* is the unique 
optimal quota allocation for the program if and only if the first-order conditions of the program are 
satisfied (see Takayama 1985, Chapter 1, Section D).  
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to Qi yields the first-order partial derivative below: 
Li = θ¯ − _θ − cEσ2[si + 2ηδi( nh 1=∑ δhQh) + 2δi2Qi]. 
The first-order conditions require that if Q* has some Qi* > 0, then Q* has to satisfy the equation Li = 0 for 
some θ¯ ≥ 0 and _θ ≥ 0. These θ¯ and _θ must be the same for all such i’s with Qi* > 0. In addition, if Q* has 
some Qj* = 0, then Q* has to satisfy the inequality Lj ≤ 0 for any such j’s for the same θ¯ and _θ. Moreover, 
Q* must satisfy constraint QC. 
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As some Qi* has to be positive, so must the difference θ¯ − _θ. Define θ* = (θ¯ − _θ)/cEσ2. The first-
order conditions are equivalent to the following ones: 
n
i 1=∑ Qi* = Q   
and some θ* > 0 exists such that  
[MCi]:   θ* ≤ si + 2ηδi( nh 1=∑ δhQh*) + 2δi2Qi*     ∀ i ∈ N 
with the equality holding for all i ∈ B* ≡ { i∈N | Qi* > 0 }. Another expression of the marginal condition 
MCi is as follows: 
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with Si(W*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW*)µδi]/cEσ2 and W* ≡ ni 1=∑ δiQi* = *B∑ δlQl*. 
To determine the values of θ* and W*, I divide MCi by 2δi and then sum over the equality marginal 
conditions, i.e., MCi’s ∀i∈B*. This yields the following equation of θ* and W*:  
θ* [(1/2) *B∑ (1/δl)] = [(1/2) *B∑ (sl/δl)]+ W* [1 + ηb*], 
where b* ≡ |B*| is the size of the supply base. Similarly, divide MCi by 2δi2 and sum over the equality 
marginal conditions. Then incorporate the quota constraint, QC. This gives a second equation of θ* and W*: 
θ* [(1/2) *B∑ (1/δl2)] = [Q + (1/2) *B∑ (sl/δl2)] + W* [η *B∑ (1/δl)]. 
The solution of the two equations is as follows: 
(η−1+b*)[2Q+ *B∑ (sl/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl)][ *B∑ (sl/δl)] θ* = 
(η−1+b*)[ *B∑ (1/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl)]2 
 
[ *B∑ (1/δl)][2Q+ *B∑ (sl/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl2)][ *B∑ (sl/δl)] W* = 
2η[ (η−1+b*)[ *B∑ (1/δl2)] – [ *B∑ (1/δl)]2 ] 
. 
 
In summary, the first-order conditions imply the conditions specified in this proposition. The reverse also 
holds with θ¯ set to cEσ2θ* and _θ set to zero.   Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 (QUALITY-DRIVEN SUPPLY BASE):  For any multiple-sourcing supply 
base B*, let supplier j be a selected supplier other than the highest-quality supplier in the supply base. 
Suppose  
max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ (ω + 2cEµδ1Q)µ. 
Because W*  = *B∑ δlQl* ≥ δ1Q,  
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(cj−1 − cj)/(δj − δj−1) ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ2 ≤ ωµ + 2W*cEµ2. 
Hence, cj + (ωµ + 2W*cEµ2)δj ≥ cj−1 + (ωµ + 2W*cEµ2)δj−1, or equivalently, 
Sj(W*) ≥ Sj−1(W*),  
where Si(W*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW*)µδi]/cEσ2. By Proposition 2, 
Qj* = [θ* − Sj(W*)]/2δj2 > 0 and 
Qj−1* ≥ [θ* − Sj−1(W*)]/2δj−12. 
Thus, Qj−1* ≥ [θ* − Sj−1(W*)]/2δj2 ≥ [θ* − Sj(W*)]/2δj2 = Qj* > 0. Since b* ≡ |B*|, it has to be that B* = {1, 
2, …, b*}.            Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR DETERMINING THE 
SIZE OF THE OPTIMAL SUPPLY BASE):  Suppose max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ (ω + 2cEµδ1Q)µ. If 
the size of the optimal supply base is j ∈ N\{n}, Proposition 3 implies B* = {1, …, j}. Consequently, 
Proposition 2 implies the existence of positive θ* and W*, as defined by formulas (1) and (2), such that  
Qj* = [θ* − Sj(W*)]/2δj2 > 0 and 
0 = Qj+1* ≥ [θ* − Sj+1(W*)]/2δj+12. 
Define θj = θ* and Wj = W*. The condition of this proposition is thus satisfied. 
 For the “if” part, suppose there exist positive θj and Wj defined by formulas (1) and (2) with B* 
substituted by Bj ≡ {1, …, j} such that [θj − Sj(Wj)]/2δj2 > 0 ≥ [θj − Sj+1(Wj)]/2δj+12. Define θ* = θj and W* = 
Wj. Then θ* and W* by construction satisfy formulas (1) and (2) for B* = Bj. Moreover, define a quota 
allocation Q* with Qi* = [θ* − Si(W*)]/2δi2 for all i ≤ j and Qi* = 0 for all i > j. Because max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − 
ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ2, a procedure similar to the proof of Proposition 3 will show that Si+1(W*) ≥ 
Si(W*) for all i ∈ N\{n}. Consequently, [θ* − Sj(W*)]/2δj2 > 0 implies Qi* = [θ* − Si(W*)]/2δi2 > 0 for all i ≤ 
j. Similarly, 0 ≥ [θ* − Sj+1(W*)]/2δj+12 implies Qi* = 0 ≥ [θ* − Si(W*)]/2δi2 for all i ≥ j +1. Thus, the marginal 
conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied by the Q* defined above. This means it is the unique optimal 
allocation for the buyer’s sourcing problem, and Bj is the optimal supply base. Hence, b* = j.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR SINGLE SOURCING TO 
BE OPTIMAL):  The “only if” part follows directly from Proposition 2. For the “if” part, it is 
straightforward to verify that for each h ∈ N, the θ h and W h defined in this proposition satisfy the formulas 
(1) and (2) of Proposition 2 for the single-sourcing supply base Bh ≡ {h}. Define for each h a quota 
allocation Qh with Q hh ≡ [θ h − Sh(W h)]/2δh2 and Q hi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N\{h}. Because θ h ≡ sh + 2(1+η)Qδh2 
and W h ≡ δhQ, clearly Q hh = Q > 0.  
To see if one or none of the Bh’s is the optimal supply base, it suffices to check whether one or 
none of them meets the remaining marginal conditions of Proposition 2, i.e., for any given h,  
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Q hi ≥ [(θ h − Si(W h))/2δi2 for all i ∈ N\{h}.  
Some h will meet this last requirement if the condition of the proposition is fulfilled. When this is the case, 
the {h} is the optimal supply base and single sourcing is optimal.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 (NON-INCREASING RESPONSE OF A SUPPLIER’S QUOTA TO THE COST 
IT CHARGES): Because of the quota constraint, the feasible choice set defined on Q is not a sublattice of 
ℜn. This prevents applying some supermodularity result directly. To get around the problem, I consider an 
equivalent formulation of the buyer’s sourcing problem as follows.  
First, the buyer takes Qi as given and choose Q−i = (Qj*)j∈N\i to minimize the part of the expected 
total cost that depends on Q−i, i.e.,  
C−i(Q−i; Qi) = iNj \∈∑ cjQj + ωµ[ ni 1=∑ δiQi] + cEµ2[ ni 1=∑ δiQi]2 + cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2], 
subject to the constraint that iNj \∈∑ Qj ≥ Q – Qi. This constraint is equivalent to the quota constraint 
because C−i(Q−i; Qi) being increasing in Q−i ensures that the inequality constraint will bind at optimum. 
This first-stage minimization problem is analogous to the original problem. Following the same proof as 
for Proposition 2, I can show that a unique minimizer Q−i*(Qi) exists. By the maximum theorem (Sundaram 
1996, p. 235), the minimized value C−i*(Qi) = C−i(Q−i*(Qi); Qi) is continuous in Qi. The non-negativity of 
Qj*(Qi)’s and Qi ensures that C−i*(Qi) is non-negative and hence bounded from below. Moving on to the 
second stage, the buyer chooses Qi ∈ [0, Q] to minimize ciQi + C−i*(Qi). A minimizer Qi* clearly exists.  
The two-stage formulation above is equivalent to the original problem, which has a unique 
solution characterized in Proposition 2. The quota allocation (Qi*, Q−i*(Qi*)) obtained from the two-stage 
formulation must be the same unique solution. In order to apply below a theorem directly, it is convenient 
to define the following: θ ≡ –ci, x ≡ Qi, and f(x, θ) ≡ θx – C−i*(x). Note that for any (x, θ) and (x′, θ′) with x 
≥ x′ and θ ≥ θ′,  
f(x, θ) – f(x′, θ)  
= [θx – C−i*(x)] – [θx′ – C−i*(x′)] 
= (θx – θx′) – (θ′x – θ′x′) + [θ′x – C−i*(x)] – [θ′x′ – C−i*(x′)]  
= (θ – θ′)(x – x′) + f(x, θ′) – f(x′, θ′) 
≥ f(x, θ′) – f(x′, θ′), 
with the inequality holding strictly whenever x > x′ and θ > θ′. So f satisfies strictly increasing differences 
in (x, θ). By Theorem 10.6 of Sundaram (1996, p. 258), the x* maximizing f over the feasible set [0, Q] ⊂ 
ℜ is non-decreasing in θ. In other words, Qi* is non-increasing in ci given c−i = (cj*)j∈N\i.   Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 (FEASIBLE PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS):  The incentive compatibility 
constraint implies that for any mi and vi,   
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Eπi(vi) ≥ Eπi(mi, vi)  
= E−i[Pi(mi, v−i) − viQi(mi, v−i)]  
= Eπi(mi) + (mi − vi)E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)]. 
Similarly, Eπi(mi) ≥ Eπi(vi) + (vi − mi)E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)]. Thus, for mi ≥ vi,  
(mi − vi)E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)] ≥ Eπi(vi) – Eπi(mi) ≥ (mi − vi)E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)] ≥ 0. 
This implies E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)] ≥ E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)] for mi ≥ vi. Moreover, since the inequalities above hold for any 
arbitrarily close mi and vi, Eπi′(vi) = dEπi(vi)/dvi = −E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)] ≤ 0. Hence 
 Eπi(vi) = Eπi(v¯) + ∫ vvi E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]dti. 
That Eπi(v¯) ≥ 0 follows directly from the individual rationality constraint. Condition (iv) is simply the 
quota constraint of the original feasibility requirement. Therefore, the “only if” part of the proof is 
completed. 
For the “if” part, first note that Qi(vi, v−i) ≥ 0 and conditions (ii) and (iii) imply the individual 
rationality constraint.  
Next, note that condition (ii) implies that for mi ≥ vi,   
 Eπi(vi) = Eπi(mi) + ∫ i
i
m
v E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]dti  
  ≥ Eπi(mi) + ∫ i
i
m
v E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)]dti  by condition (i) 
= Eπi(mi) + (mi − vi)E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)] 
= Eπi(mi, vi).  
Similarly, Eπi(mi) ≥ Eπi(vi) + (vi − mi)E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)] = Eπi(vi, mi) for mi ≥ vi. Swapping the roles of mi and 
vi, I get Eπi(vi) ≥ Eπi(mi, vi) for mi ≤ vi. Hence, for any mi and vi, the incentive compatibility constraint is 
implied. This completes the “if” part of the proof.      Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2 (SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS):  The 
buyer’s sourcing problem is to find an optimal procurement contract to minimize the expected total cost of 
sourcing below, subject to the feasibility conditions (i) to (iv) in Lemma 1: 
E[ ni 1=∑ Pi(v) + CX(Q(v))], 
where the expectation E[?] is taken over v = (vi)i∈N and CX(Q) ≡ C(Q;(ωµ/cEσ2)δ), with C(Q; s) ≡ 
cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ siQi + η( ni 1=∑ δiQi)2 + ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2]. By definition, Pi(v) = viQi(v) + πi(vi, vi). Therefore,  
E−i[Pi(v)] = E−i[viQi(v)] + Eπi(vi) 
= viE−i[Qi(v)] + ∫ vvi E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]dti + Eπi(v¯). 
Note that  
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E[∫ vvi E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]dti] = ∫ vv ∫ vvi E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]f(vi)dtidvi 
 = ∫ vv ∫ itv E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]f(vi)dvidti 
 = ∫ vv E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]F(ti)dti 
 = ∫ vv {E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)]F(vi)/f(vi)}f(vi)dvi 
 = E[E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)]F(vi)/f(vi)] 
 = E[Qi(v)F(vi)/f(vi)].  
Hence, 
E[Pi(v)] = E[E−i[Pi(v)]]  
= E[viE−i[Qi(v)]] + E[∫ vvi E−i[Qi(ti, v−i)]dti] + Eπi(v¯) 
= E[(vi + F(vi)/f(vi))Qi(v)] + Eπi(v¯) 
and  
E[ ni 1=∑ Pi(v)] = ni 1=∑ E[p(vi)Qi(v)] + ni 1=∑ Eπi(v¯),  
where p(vi) = vi + F(vi)/f(vi). The buyer’s objective function can thus be expressed as  
E[ ni 1=∑  p(vi)Qi(v) + CX(Q(v))] + ni 1=∑ Eπi(v¯), 
where CX(Q(v)) = cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ (ωµ/cEσ2)δiQi(v) + η( ni 1=∑ δiQi(v))2 + ni 1=∑ δi2Qi(v)2]. Define  
γi(vi) ≡ (p(vi)+ωµδi)/cEσ2 
The expression of the objective function can be further simplified as  
E[C(Q(v); γ(v))] + ni 1=∑ Eπi(v¯),  
where γ(v) = (γi(vi))i∈N.  
 Note that the payment rules appear only in the second term of the objective function. Suppose that 
given any profile of allocation rules fulfilling the quota constraint, the payment rules can be chosen to 
satisfy the feasibility conditions (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 1 and also minimize ni 1=∑ Eπi(v¯) to zero (i.e., its 
lowest possible value). Then a profile of optimal allocation rules can be determined by simply minimizing 
the first term of the objective function subject to the remaining feasibility conditions. One can also find a 
candidate profile first by ignoring the feasibility condition (i) and later show that the profile also satisfies 
the constraint although it was not explicitly included in the minimization process initially.     
 In the following, I will show that if Q*(?) minimizes E[C(Q(v); γ(v))] subject to the quota 
constraint, with Qi*(vi, v−i) being non-increasing in vi given v−i, and P*(?) is set such that Pi*(v) = viQi*(v) + 
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∫ vvi Qi*(ti, v−i)dti, then 〈Q*(?), P*(?)〉 is a feasible contract minimizing ni 1=∑ Eπi(v¯) to zero. Consequently, the 
contract must also be optimal.  
To begin, note that because Qi*(vi, v−i) is non-increasing in vi, 
mi ≥ vi  ⇒  Qi(vi, v−i) ≥ Qi(mi, v−i) for any given v−i.  
Consequently, E−i[Qi(vi, v−i)] ≥ E−i[Qi(mi, v−i)]. So the feasibility condition (i) in Lemma 1 is satisfied. Next, 
the payment rule specified in the proposition implies that Pi*(v) – viQi*(v) = ∫ vvi Qi*(ti, v−i)dti. Therefore, 
Eπi(vi) = Eπi(vi, vi) = E−i[πi(vi, vi)] = E−i[Pi*(v) – viQi*(v)] = ∫ vvi E−i[Qi*(ti, v−i)]dti. Clearly, Eπi(v¯) = 0 for all i. 
Hence the feasibility condition (iii) is also satisfied and ni 1=∑ Eπi(v¯) = 0. In addition, Eπi(vi) = Eπi(v¯) + 
∫ vvi E−i[Qi*(ti, v−i)]dti for all i. The feasibility condition (ii) is met as well. By the supposition of the 
proposition, Q*(?) minimizes E[C(Q(v); γ(v))] subject to the quota constraint. Thus, the feasibility 
condition (iv) is also met. Since 〈Q*(?), P*(?)〉 is a feasible contract minimizing the two terms of the 
buyer’s objective function individually, it must also be an optimal procurement contract minimizing the 
objective function.          Q.E.D. 
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7 (OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACT): Given γ(v) = 
((p(vi)+ωµδi)/cEσ2)i∈N, the pointwise minimization of C(Q(v); γ(v)) by an allocation Q(v) subject to the 
constraint of ni 1=∑ Qi(v) = Q will give an allocation rule Q(?) that minimizes E[C(Q(v); γ(v))] subject to 
the quota constraint for all v∈ [v, v¯]n. Note that C(Q(v); γ(v)) is simply the buyer’s expected total cost of 
sourcing when the per-unit procurement costs taken as given are ci = p(vi) ≡ vi + F(vi)/f(vi) for all i. So for 
any v, the unique Q*(v) that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 2 for such ci’s will constitute an 
allocation rule minimizing E[C(Q(v); γ(v))] subject to the quota constraint regardless of v. By Proposition 
6, Qi*(vi, v−i) is non-increasing in p(vi). If p(vi) is non-decreasing in vi, Qi*(vi, v−i) is non-increasing vi. By 
Lemma 2, 〈Q*(?), P*(?)〉, with Pi*(v) = viQi*(v) + ∫ vvi Qi*(ti, v−i)dti, is an optimal procurement contract. 
Finally, suppose further that p(v¯) − p(v) ≤ (ω + 2cEµδ1Q)µ[min i∈{2,…,n} (δi − δi−1)]. By Proposition 3, the 
optimal quota allocation Q*(v) is strongly quality-driven for any realized v.     Q.E.D. 
REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES IN ECONOMICS: Before giving a brief account of related 
economic studies, let me clarify some confusion on the usage of the term “multiple sourcing.” In 
management studies, multiple sourcing generally means split procurement arrangement, i.e., relying on two 
or more suppliers in procuring an item. The sourcing literature in economics, however, also uses multiple 
sourcing to mean sharable procurement arrangement, i.e., having two or more suppliers compete for a 
share in supplying an item without precluding the one-supplier-take-all outcome. The key difference is that 
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multiple sourcing of the sharable sense (hereafter, sharable multiple sourcing) refers to an ex ante 
arrangement concerning the degree of supplier competition, i.e., at least two competitors, whereas multiple 
sourcing of the split sense (hereafter, split multiple sourcing) refers to an ex post arrangement concerning 
the outcome of supplier competition, i.e., at least two winners. In other words, sharable multiple sourcing 
can end up having only one selected supplier, as long as multiple suppliers have competed for being the 
one selected. Some studies (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1988, Riordan and Sappington 1989) claim to analyze 
multiple sourcing but are better described as studying source switching, i.e., about examining the effects of 
introducing additional suppliers to compete with an incumbent in one-supplier-take-all settings.13  
The sourcing literature in economics is largely based on auction models (e.g., Myerson 1981, 
Laffont and Tirole 1987). It typically concludes that split multiple sourcing is undesirable unless suppliers 
have increasing marginal costs with sufficiently low fixed costs (e.g., the third case studied by Dasgupta 
and Spulber 1989/90 and the second case analyzed by Auriol and Laffont 1992). As noted by McMillan 
(1990), “the disadvantage of multiple sourcing is that economies of scale may be forgone.” So for multiple 
sourcing to be better than single sourcing, scale diseconomies have to be sufficiently great.  
When suppliers have constant marginal costs with positive fixed costs (e.g., the first case analyzed 
by Auriol and Laffont 1992 and the settings studied by Demski, Sappington, and Spiller 1987 and Riordan 
1996), split multiple sourcing usually is undesirable because of duplication of fixed costs.14 However, it is 
always good to have more suppliers competing for a procurement contract as this increases the chance of 
finding a lower-cost supplier. This sampling effect makes sharable multiple sourcing desirable, regardless 
of the suppliers’ cost structure. 
Some studies have examined the effects of incomplete information about suppliers’ types on the 
dis/advantages of multiple sourcing and the sourcing decision. Auriol and Laffont (1992) find that the 
sampling effect is higher under incomplete information than under complete information, provided the 
consumer demand is sufficiently price-inelastic. If the consumer demand is sufficiently price-elastic, the 
                                                   
13 More precisely, Laffont and Tirole (1988) uses the term “second sourcing,” which is a special case of multiple sourcing 
when there are only two suppliers. Second sourcing also has the connotation of finding a second supplier in addition to an 
incumbent, or to replace the incumbent when used in the source switching sense. Such usages are particularly suitable for 
describing the sourcing decision in a multiple-period or multiple-stage setting, as in Demski, Sappington, and Spiller (1987), 
Laffont and Tirole (1988), and Riordan and Sappington (1989). In a single-period setting, dual sourcing seems to be a better term 
for describing the two-supplier case of multiple sourcing. 
 
14 Dana and Spier (1994) and McGuire and Riordan (1995) have studied settings with constant marginal costs and positive 
fixed costs yet still found a split-award outcome (i.e., the duopoly market structure in their models) sometimes desirable. Dana 
and Spier’s result is driven by smaller efficiency loss resulting from Cournot competition by the suppliers in the case of dual 
sourcing, as compared to unregulated monopoly in the case of single sourcing. McGuire and Riordan’s result is due to the spatial 
competition model embedded in their model: a product differentiation benefit, playing the same role as increasing marginal costs, 
arises when aggregating the social value of the treatment to clients uniformly distributed on a line of unit length. 
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contrary instead holds. Riordan (1996) studies a setting with an exogenous procurement quantity 
requirement, which resembles a price-inelastic demand. He finds that incomplete information biases the 
choice of the market structure in his model towards sharable multiple sourcing, a result consistent with 
Auriol and Laffont’s.  
By contrast, Dana and Spier (1994) draw a different conclusion about split multiple sourcing. 
Because the split-award outcome is a weaker penalty to a lying supplier than the no-award outcome (i.e., 
single sourcing from a rival supplier), split multiple sourcing is less powerful in discouraging suppliers 
from lying about their types. Thus, it should be used less often under incomplete information than under 
complete information. McGuire and Riordan (1995) obtain a similar result for some parameter values of 
their model, and the contrary for some other values.  
The research discussed so far follows a normative approach to study the optimal sourcing decision. 
Some other research by contrast uses a positive approach to investigate when multiple sourcing can arise in 
equilibrium. Anton and Yao (1989) consider a setting with two suppliers playing a sharable procurement 
auction. Interestingly, the buyer is indifferent among all equilibria, which include single-sourcing from the 
lower-cost supplier. So although dual sourcing can arise in equilibrium, it brings no benefit to the buyer. 
Extending their model to include incomplete information, Anton and Yao (1992) show that dual sourcing 
can arise in equilibrium if a technical condition is fulfilled. This condition ensures that dual-source 
production is less expensive than sole-source production.  
Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien (1991) study a procurement auction model with endogenous 
choice of participation. They point out that specifying in advance a greater number of winners to split the 
procurement contract may increase the chance of winning. This encourages more suppliers to send in bids 
and stimulates supplier competition. The downside of expanding the supply base is the higher production 
costs of the marginal winner, which are borne by the buyer.15 
 From this review, it is clear that the sourcing literature in economics has focused only on the 
competition advantage of multiple sourcing, with no attention given to the protection advantage of multiple 
sourcing. Neither has this advantage received sufficient attention in OR/MS studies, as explained in the 
introduction.  
 
                                                   
15 Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien’s approach has some normative favor. Although the winner selection and award splitting 
rules are exogenously specified, they discuss the implications of expanding the supply base as if it were a design instrument of 
the buyer. 
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Table 1.  Notations  
N = {1, 2, …, n} is the index set of the n suppliers (n ≥ 2). 
Qi = the production quota allocated to supplier i (Qi ≥ 0). 
Q = n
i 1=∑ Qi is the total procurement quantity (Q > 0). 
Q = (Qi)i∈N is the production quota allocation. 
ci = per-unit procurement cost charged by supplier i. 
Di = RiδiQi is the amount of defective parts manufactured by supplier i.  
Ri ≥ 0, or more precisely Riδi, is referred to as the random yield loss of supplier i. The 
random variables Ri’s are independently and identically distributed with mean E(Ri) = µ, 
where 0 < µ  ≤ µ¯ << 1, and variance var(Ri) = σ2 > 0. 
η = (µ/σ)2 is the squared standardized mean of the “random yield loss” Ri, or equivalently, 
η−1 is referred to as the squared coefficient of variation. 
δi > 0 is a parameter affecting the random yield loss of supplier i (δi ≤ 1). The value 1−δi is 
referred to as the quality-based scoring index of the supplier, or simply its quality level. 
It is assumed that δ1 < δ2 < … < δn. 
D = n
i 1=∑ Di is the total amount of defective products sold to end customers by the buyer. It 
becomes observable after the customers have experienced field failures of the products 
and take them back for warranty repair. 
ω > 0 is the constant marginal cost of warranty repair. 
CE(D) = cED2 is the other external failure cost (e.g., reputation damage) borne by the buyer, in 
addition to the warranty-related cost, as a result of the defective products sold to 
customers (where cE > 0). 
si = (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ2 is a ratio representing the relative unimportance of the quadratic other 
external failure cost, characterized by cE, in constituting the buyer’s expected total cost. 
Si(W*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW*)µδi]/cEσ2 = = si + 2ηW*δi is referred to as the quality-adjusted cost-
based scoring index for supplier i, evaluated at W* = ni 1=∑ δiQi* based on the optimal 
quota allocation Q* = (Qi*)i∈N.  
B = { i∈N | Qi > 0 } is the set of selected suppliers constituting the supply base. 
b = |B| is the size of the supply base B. 
C(Q; s) = cEσ2[ ni 1=∑ siQi + η( ni 1=∑ δiQi)2 + ni 1=∑ δi2Qi2], where s = (si)i∈N, is the buyer’s expected 
total cost of sourcing.  
CX(Q) = C(Q;(ωµ/cEσ2)δ), where δ = (δi)i∈N, is the buyer’s expected external failure cost. 
〈Q(?), P(?)〉 = a procurement contract constituted of a profile of allocations Q(?) = (Qi(?))i∈N and 
payments P(?) = (Pi(?))i∈N for any profile of the suppliers’ unit costs of production v = 
(vi)i∈N ∈ [v, v¯]. 
Eπi(vi) = Eπi(vi, vi), where Eπi(mi, vi) = E−i[πi(mi, vi)], with the expectation E−i[?] taken over v−i = 
(vj)j∈N\i, and πi(mi, vi) = Pi(mi, v−i) − viQi(mi, v−i) for any vi ∈ [v, v¯] and mi ∈ [v, v¯].  
p(vi) = vi + F(vi)/f(vi) is the virtual unit variable production cost of supplier i; f(vi) > 0 for all vi 
∈ [v, v¯] is the density function of the probability distribution function F(vi).  
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Appendix B 
RECENT CASES OF MASSIVE PRODUCT RECALLS: The most noticeable cases are recalls of 
unsafe products manufactured by suppliers in China. These include  
(i) Toys. Mattel recalled 436,000 Chinese-made toy cars covered with lead paint in 2007 (Story 
and Barboza 2007). This incident raised concerns about the insufficient enforcement of existing laws 
banning lead paint. Such concerns forced other U.S. manufacturers to recall over a million toy ovens, 
trains, dolls, and other popular toys.  
According to Egan, Campbell, and Vogel (2009), “[t]he purported culprit was a Chinese supplier 
that had subcontracted its work to another Chinese company that had coated the toy cars with lead paint 
without the knowledge of the U.S. manufacturer. … The foreseeability of these events by any U.S. 
manufacturer is doubtful. In China, as in the United States, lead paint is illegal. Nevertheless, it appears 
that a number of Chinese companies began using lead paint because it is more resistant to corrosion and 
dries faster, thereby, in part, decreasing production time.  
Until the 2007 toy recalls, the Chinese government was seemingly unaware that lead paint was 
widely used in its manufacturing sector, and therefore, did not sufficiently enforce lead paint prohibitions. 
Similarly the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission was also unable to enforce existing laws banning 
lead paint because it had only around 100 field investigators who were responsible for inspecting $22 
billion in toys.” For further details of this incident, see also Barboza (2007) and Lipton and Barboza 
(2007). 
(ii) Drugs. Heparin is a blood thinner widely used in surgery and dialysis. In early 2008, heparin 
sold by Baxter International was linked to at least 19 deaths and hundreds of allergic reactions in the U.S.. 
After recalling nine lots of the drug, problems continued. So the company suspended the manufacturing of 
the drug associated with the problems.  
Investigations later discovered that the heparin at issue, with its raw components bought from a 
Chinese plant, contained a contaminant mimicking heparin. By that time, Baxter had expanded the recall to 
cover almost all its heparin products. Because the company supplies about half the U.S.’s heparin, the 
production suspension and the widespread recall caused worries about shortage problems in the short and 
long runs. The impact was so huge that some even warned that “many more patients would be likely to 
experience significant blood loss during dialysis.” For further details of the incident, see Harris (2008a,b), 
Bogdanich (2008a,b), and Barboza (2008a). 
(iii) Dairy products. In July 2008, infant milk formula produced by Sanlu Group, the largest milk 
power maker in China for 15 years in a row, were found to contain a toxic industrial chemical called 
melamine. Follow-up investigations discovered the same problem in the products of 21 other companies. 
  ii
Melamine was added to milk to raise the protein count artificially and fool safety tests for protein content. 
The contamination caused at least six infants dying from kidney stones and other complications and 
sickened over 50,000 children.  
Exports of food ingredients from China have been growing in recent years. Because milk powder 
is an ingredient to many dairy products, the milk scandal scared the international community. Tests showed 
that many products of international brands were also tainted by melamine, leading to worldwide recalls of 
contaminated products. Affected brands include Nabisco, Kraft Foods, Heinz, Mars, Cadbury, Lipton, and 
Nestles.  
The scope of the contamination later spread to eggs traced back to the use of melamine-tainted 
animal feed, even though the chemical had been banned as an animal feed additive since July 2007. In 
reacting to the scandal, over 25 countries banned imports of dairy and other affected food products from 
China. For further details of the scandal, see Barboza (2008b,c) and Fuller (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
